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On the publisher’s website this book is commended as the «first col-
lection of essays entirely devoted to the inscription of Diogenes of 
Oinoanda». Indeed, this book can be said to represent a new stage in 
the research into this very important document.
The inscription, which was set up in the early second century AD 
in Oinoanda in Southern Turkey, provides an elaborate exposition 
of the philosophy of Epicurus (341-270 BC). It was discovered in 1884, 
and so far 299 fragments have been brought to light, in various states 
of preservation and readability.
For the last half century the study of Diogenes’ inscription has been 
dominated by the towering figure of Martin Ferguson Smith (Durham 
University), whose editions with translations and commentary – both 
philological and philosophical – still provide the best if not the only 
ways of access to the fragments. Most of the results of his research 
have been brought together in two volumes: M. F. Smith, Diogenes of 
Oinoanda. The Epicurean Inscription, Bibliopolis, Naples 1993; and M. 
F. Smith, Supplement to Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Epicurean Inscription, 
Bibliopolis, Naples 2003. From 2007 onwards Smith has been work-
ing together with Jürgen Hammerstaedt (University of Cologne). The 
results of their investigations have been conveniently collected in J. 
Hammerstaedt-M. F. Smith, The Epicurean Inscription of Diogenes of 
Oinoanda. Ten Years of New Discoveries and Research, Rudolf Habelt 
Verlag, Bonn 2014. 
Besides these two scholars, over the years many others have involved 
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themselves with the inscription or portions of it, offering new interpre-
tations of its philosophical content, and sometimes proposing alterna-
tive readings. In recent times, the inscription has been the subject of a 
monograph by P. Gordon, Epicurus in Lycia. The Second-Century World 
of Diogenes of Oenoanda, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour 
1996, while specific parts have been dealt with by, for instance, D. Clay, 
Diogenes and his Gods, in M. Erler (ed.), Epikureismus in der späten Republik 
und der Kaiserzeit, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2000, pp. 76-92; D. N. 
Sedley, Diogenes of Oenoanda on Cyrenaic Hedonism, «Proceedings of the 
Cambridge Philological Society» 48 (2002), pp. 159-174; N. Pace, Religione 
ed etica nel NF 126 Smith di Diogene di Enoanda, «Cronache Ercolanesi» 35 
(2005), pp. 201-209; and F. G. Corsi, Il metodo delle molteplici spiegazioni in 
Diogene di Enoanda, «Syzetesis» IV/2 (2017), pp. 253-284.
However, although scholarly engagement with Diogenes’ inscrip-
tion is not new, the present volume is exceptional in enlisting so many 
scholars to its study at the same time. The volume emerged from an 
international colloquium on Diogenes of Oinoanda held in 2014 at the 
universities of Istanbul and Muğla in Turkey. The focus of the book is 
on Diogenes’ polemics against philosophical opponents, with special 
attention to the question of Diogenes’ orthodoxy and originality with 
respect to Epicurus and the Epicurean tradition. The volume compris-
es twelve contributions in either English or French. The articles are 
preceded by a table of contents (pp. vii-viii), a list of illustrations (pp. 
ix-x), a Foreword (pp. xi-xvii), written by Martin Ferguson Smith, and a 
Preface (pp. xix-xxv), written by two of the editors, Pierre-Marie Morel 
and Jürgen Hammerstaedt. The articles are followed by a list of abbre-
viations (p. 271), a Bibliography (pp. 273-290), biographical information 
about the authors (pp. 291-293), and five indices, viz. of Places (pp. 295-
296), of Gods and Mythological Figures or Concepts (p. 296), of Ancient 
Persons, Philosophical Schools and Concepts (pp. 297-300), of Persons of 
Modern Times (pp. 301-303), and of Ancient Texts (pp. 304-321). The book 
is dedicated to the memory of Martin Bachmann, the Deputy Director 
of the Istanbul Department of the German Archaeological Institute, 
who led the investigations at Oinoanda in 2007-2012 and 2015, and one 
of the contributors to the volume, who died unexpectedly in August 
2016, just months before the book was due to appear.
The first two articles are not philosophical in content, but provide 
some background information that is indispensable for anyone dealing 
with the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda. Both articles are pro-
vided with beautiful photographs, maps and other illustrations. In the 
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first article, Oinoanda: Research in the City of Diogenes (pp. 1-28), Martin 
Bachmann provides an overview of the archaeological research con-
ducted at Oinoanda from its rediscovery in 1841 till the present. In the 
second article, The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes in the Epigraphic 
Context of Oinoanda (pp. 29-50), Jürgen Hammerstaedt sketches the 
original structure, the historical and epigraphic context, and the subse-
quent vicissitudes of the inscription, as well as the current state of the 
research. The next ten articles all address the philosophical content of 
the inscription.
In the third article, Diogenes against Plato: Diogenes’ Critique and the 
Tradition of Epicurean Antiplatonism (pp. 51-65), Michael Erler discusses 
two passages: NF 155 and Theol. III 7-IV 5, both of which critically engage 
with Plato – the first passage overtly, the other (or so Erler believes) 
implicitly. In NF 155 Diogenes criticizes Plato’s asymmetric thesis that 
the world had a beginning but will not have and end. Although this 
criticism – based on a literal reading of Plato’s Timaeus (esp. 32c, 38b, 
41a-b) – was traditional, Diogenes’ choice of words is not: copying Plato’s 
own terminology Diogenes suggests that Plato would have done better 
to use «nature as a craftsman» (φύσει δημιουργῷ). According to Erler 
this combination of words, which is rare in general, and unprecedented 
in Epicurean literature (but see Verde’s useful suggestions on pp. 82-84 
of the volume), is best understood in the context of an on-going debate 
about creation and providence conducted between Epicureans and 
Middle-Platonists such as Atticus. Erler next discusses a passage of the 
“Theological Physics-sequence” (henceforth Theol. = NF 167 + NF 126/127 
+ fr. 20 + NF 182: see J. Hammerstaedt-M.F. Smith, op. cit., pp. 263-270). 
Here Diogenes refers to certain people (III 7-IV 5) who are righteous 
because they live according to Epicurean philosophy. These people are 
contrasted with ordinary people, who «are righteous, in so far they are 
righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the 
laws, hanging over them» (IV 5-10). According to Erler this disproves 
the oft-repeated claim that the Epicureans were legalists, for on this 
account a community of Epicureans would not need laws to be just. In 
this respect, Erler argues, an Epicurean community would be similar to 
Plato’s Kallipolis in the Republic, where laws are not necessary to ensure 
justice either. However, although Erler’s account certainly opens up 
some interesting new points of view, a few critical observations are in 
order. In the first place, the passage under discussion does not describe 
an Epicurean ideal city, but a mixed society in which different motiva-
tions for being righteous exist alongside each other. For a description 
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of an Epicurean utopia Erler would have done better to turn to fr. 56 
of Diogenes’ inscription (discussed by Morel on pp. 233-237 of the vol-
ume). Secondly, Erler does not make it quite clear what he means with 
“law” or νόμος. According to Theol. IV 5-10, an important aspect of laws 
is that they are enforced by penalties (see Morel pp. 226 and 231-232 of 
the volume). When the Epicureans say that sages don’t need laws, it is 
this external enforcement they must have in mind. It is still a matter 
of debate whether a community of Epicurean sages could do without 
rules altogether (see e.g. E. Brown, Politics and society, in J. Warren (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2009, pp. 179-196, esp. 189-195; and J. Thrasher, Reconciling 
Justice and Pleasure in Epicurean Contractarianism, «Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice» 16.2 (2013), pp. 423-436), but they certainly don’t need 
penalties to remain righteous. Thirdly, I don’t think Plato’s Kallipolis 
provides a good parallel for the Epicurean ideal city. In contrast to what 
Erler says (p. 64) Plato’s Kallipolis does have laws (e.g. Resp. III 415e et 
passim) as well as penalties for those who break them (e.g. Resp. III 389d; 
III 415e; V 465a). In fact, the Epicurean ideal city, as described in fr. 56, in 
which there is «no need of fortifications or laws», and where tasks are 
divided equally, is much more like Plato’s “city of pigs” (Resp. II 372d), 
to which Kallipolis is only second best (cfr. B. Farrington, The faith of 
Epicurus, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1967, pp. 16-18).
In the fourth article, Plato’s Demiurge (NF 155 = YF 200) and Aristotle’s 
Flux (fr. 5 Smith): Diogenes of Oinoanda on the History of Philosophy (pp. 
67-87), Francesco Verde discusses two fragments, fr. 5 and NF 155. In 
both fragments Diogenes presents and critically engages with the 
views of earlier philosophers. In fr. 5, Diogenes criticizes Aristotle and 
the Peripatetics for denying the possibility of scientific knowledge on 
account of the rapidity of the flux, a view that in reality cannot possi-
bly be identified with any known Aristotelian theory. The criticism is 
part of a longer passage, already started in fr. 4, in which several phi-
losophers, possibly including Pyrrhonian and Academic sceptics, are 
attacked for rejecting natural philosophy. Verde argues persuasively 
that the source of the entire passage, including the reference to the 
presumed Aristotelian flux theory, must be an Epicurean doxograph-
ical reconstruction that bears witness to a specifically Epicurean way 
of using the past, which «does not aim to be historically objective, 
but often adopts a hostile approach» (p. 78). Next, Verde deals with 
NF 155, already discussed by Erler in the previous article (see above). 
Assuming, with J. Hammerstaedt-M. F. Smith, op. cit., pp. 25, that NF 155 
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may have immediately followed fr. 100, which dealt with a Stoic theory, 
Verde suggests that NF 155 implicitly criticizes the Stoics as well. I must 
admit I am not convinced by this part of Verde’s argument. In the first 
place, fr. 100 is so badly preserved that we cannot be sure what it was 
about or even whether it mentioned the Stoics at all (see app. crit. in 
M. F. Smith, Diogenes of Oinoanda, cit., p. 289); in the second place, it is 
not certain that fr. 100 and NF 155 were contiguous; and, finally, since 
both fragments belong to the Maxims, which are self-contained units, 
there is no reason to connect the two, even if they were contiguous. 
Still, the suggestion that NF 155 might be read as an implicit criticism 
of an alleged Stoic theory is attractive. Possible parallels are Pseudo-
Plutarch Placita II 4, 1, where the asymmetric thesis is attributed to the 
Stoics, and – in an Epicurean context – Cic., ND, I 20, where this thesis 
is first attributed to Plato, and then hypothetically extended to the 
Stoics («Pronoea vero si vestra est, Lucili, eadem, requiro, quae paulo ante»). 
That Diogenes did sometimes ascribe Platonic views to the Stoics we 
can see in Theol. XI 11-XIII 10, where the Stoics are (wrongly) charged 
with the view that the gods were idle during the infinity of time before 
they created the world. For an Epicurean parallel see Cic., ND, I 21-22, 
where this view is attributed to Plato and the Stoics together (see D. N. 
Sedley, Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity, University of California 
Press, Berkeley 2007, p. 143, with nn. 21-22). It is not unlikely, therefore, 
that NF 155, while explicitly criticizing Plato, was meant to apply to the 
Stoics as well. At any rate, as Verde observes, the fragment shows the 
same hostility towards Plato that we find in other Epicurean texts, such 
as Cic. ND 1, where criticism of Plato and the Stoics went hand in hand, 
and with which it may well share a common Epicurean source.
In the fifth article, Diogène d’Œnoanda et la polémique sur les meteora 
(pp. 89-110), Giuliana Leone discusses a number of fragments (viz. frs. 
4, 13, 14, and Theol. XIV 13-XVI 7) which deal with τὰ μετέωρα, i.e. astro-
nomical and atmospheric phenomena. Leone argues that in all these 
fragments Diogenes’ treatment of the subject is very close to Epicurus’, 
not just from a lexical and stylistic point of view but also conceptually, 
showing the same ethical and theological concerns. Especially inter-
esting, if not problematic, in this respect, is fr. 13 III 1-13. Here Diogenes 
introduces the method of multiple explanations, which is also known 
from Epicurus’ Letter to Pythocles and the corresponding sections of 
Lucretius’ De rerum natura. However, while Diogenes’ treatment is oth-
erwise very close to Epicurus’ in the Letter to Pythocles, it differs from 
Epicurus’ method in one respect: while Epicurus (just like Lucretius) 
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never expresses epistemic distinctions between the various alternative 
explanations, Diogenes explicitly allows for different degrees of plau-
sibility. In F. A. Bakker, Epicurean Meteorology: Sources, Method, Scope 
and Organization, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2016, pp. 37-42, I have argued 
that this “probabilism” was an innovation with respect to Epicurus’ 
method, that may have been introduced as a way to conform to the 
accepted astronomical views of the time without rejecting Epicurus’ 
method of multiple explanations altogether. Dismissing this inter-
pretation, Leone instead endorses the view of F. Verde, Cause epicuree, 
«Antiquorum Philosophia» 7 (2013), pp. 127-142 (esp. pp. 136-137 and 
141-142), who proposed two alternative interpretations that would both 
safeguard Diogenes’ orthodoxy: Diogenes’ probabilism would reflect a 
later stage in the development of the method of multiple explanations 
– possibly instigated by attacks on the part of Academic sceptics – that 
was either (1) already present in works that Epicurus himself composed 
after the Letter to Pythocles, e.g. in the later books of the On nature, or (2) 
developed by subsequent generations of Epicureans – perhaps already 
by Epicurus’ direct disciples. Leone favours the first option, which 
she supports with quotations from Epicurus’ Letters to Pythocles and 
to Herodotus, as well as from his On nature (from books XI and XIV), in 
which Epicurus seems to admit different degrees of probability. This 
is not the place to enter into a detailed response to Leone’s arguments, 
for which the reader is referred to F. Corsi, art. cit., pp. 259-263 and 278-
282. However, I would like to add a few general remarks of my own. 
Firstly, while attempting to safeguard Diogenes’ orthodoxy, Leone 
seems to lose sight of the undeniable doctrinal difference between 
Epicurus’ method of multiple explanations and Diogenes’ probabil-
ism. Secondly, even if Epicurus himself did occasionally admit degrees 
of probability, as Leone argues, this is still a long way from adopting a 
wholly probabilistic version of the method of multiple explanations. 
Thirdly, if there is any truth to Sedley’s claim about Lucretius’ “fun-
damentalism” (D. N. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek 
Wisdom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, pp. 62-93), the 
absence of references to probabilism in Lucretius’ version of the meth-
od of multiple explanations suggests that probabilism did not figure 
in the sources that Lucretius considered authoritative. Hence it seems 
to me that the development of a probabilistic version of the method 
of multiple explanations probably postdates Epicurus himself. For a 
similar conclusion see F. Corsi, art. cit., p. 282.
The next three articles all revisit the old controversy over whether 
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fr. 33 (including NF 128), which deals with the relation between virtue 
and pleasure, is aimed at the Stoics or the Cyrenaics. The first view was 
championed by Smith (M. F. Smith, Diogenes of Oenoanda, cit., pp. 482-
483 and id., Supplement, cit., pp. 90-98), and supported by Hammerstaedt 
(in J. Hammerstaedt-M. F. Smith, op. cit., pp. 249-252), the second by 
Sedley (D. N. Sedley, Diogenes of Oenoanda, cit.), both sides supporting 
their interpretations with their own reconstructions of the incomplete 
and damaged text of the fragment.
In the first of these three articles and the sixth of the volume, 
entitled Virtue, Pleasure, and Cause: A case of multi-target polemic? (pp. 
111-141), Francesca Masi discusses this fragment together with fr. 
32 and NF 192, which deal with the same subject and are believed 
to have preceded it. In my view, Masi’s article presents one of the 
highlights of the volume. Preserving a critical distance with respect 
to either of the two interpretations and critically reviewing the var-
ious reconstructions, she concludes that not just fr. 33, but also fr. 
32, are open to either interpretation: both could be directed against 
the Stoics, and both to the Cyrenaics. However, having reached this 
cautious conclusion, Masi goes on to present a more daring and yet 
very attractive proposal, to the effect that in fr. 32, NF 192 and fr. 33 
Diogenes would have had two different targets in mind: the Stoics, 
who in all three fragments are addressed in the second person plu-
ral, and the Cyrenaics, who are consistently referred to in the third 
person plural, and whose notion of virtue as an antecedent cause of 
pleasure Diogenes wishes to dissociate himself from.
In the seventh article, Diogenes of Oinoanda and the Cyrenaics (pp. 
143-164), Voula Tsouna discusses a number of fragments where she 
believes Diogenes is criticizing the Cyrenaics. The first fragment to be 
discussed is fr. 4, where «Socrates and his companions» are rebuked 
for denying the usefulness of natural philosophy. Tsouna observes 
(p. 144) that this criticism would apply not just to Plato’s Socrates, but 
also to «two schools that sprang from his circle, namely the Cynics 
and the Cyrenaics». Next, Tsouna deals with fr. 49, the only fragment 
where a Cyrenaic philosopher, viz. Aristippus, is mentioned by name. 
In this fragment Aristippus’ crude hedonism, which focuses on the 
immediate pleasures of the body, is contrasted to Epicurus’ more 
subtle hedonism, which includes and even privileges pleasures of the 
soul regarding not just the present but also the past and the future. 
Tsouna argues that fr. 44, which may have stood not too far before 
fr. 49, was part of the same argument and may also have been aimed 
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at the Cyrenaics. Next Tsouna discusses fr. 33. In contrast to Masi’s 
cautious approach, Tsouna openly sides with Sedley, whose interpre-
tation and emendations she follows. Although there is a certain circu-
larity to this approach, as Sedley’s emendations are meant to support 
his interpretation, Tsouna’s discussion is very insightful about the 
contrast between Cyrenaic and Epicurean hedonism. Tsouna con-
cludes her article with a discussion of several other fragments, which 
she believes could also be read as criticizing the Cyrenaics.
In the eighth article, La critique des stoïciens dans l’inscription d’Œnoan-
da (pp. 165-185), Jean-Baptiste Gourinat explores the ways in which 
Diogenes’ dealt with the Stoics. Gourinat discusses a number of frag-
ments where the Stoics are either explicitly targeted, or have been 
assumed to be the intended targets. The most interesting fragments in 
this study are fr. 10 and fr. 33. In fr. 10, Diogenes sets up a contrast between 
two equally mistaken extremes – the Stoics who deprive dreams of every 
power they might have, and Democritus who grants them a power they 
don’t have. Gourinat argues that Diogenes’ account of the Stoic position 
is a distortion constructed precisely in order to be better able to oppose 
the Stoics to Democritus and so create a schema in which the truth of 
the Epicurean position comes out most clearly. As regards fr. 33 Gourinat 
reopens the case for identifying Diogenes’ opponents with the Stoics, 
offering several fresh arguments to the old debate. The most interest-
ing conclusions to emerge from Gourinat’s article are the following: (1) 
Diogenes is prone to distort his opponents’ views for dialectical reasons, 
and (2) Diogenes’ criticism of the Stoics often takes the form of a coun-
ter-attack against Stoic anti-Epicurean arguments.
In the ninth article, Diogenes of Oinoanda and the Epicurean 
Epistemology of Dreams (pp. 187-205), Refik Güremen analyses Diogenes’ 
account of dreams as presented in frs. 9, 10 and 43. Güremen largely 
agrees with Gourinat, expanding upon, and occasionally correcting the 
latter’s account, and supplementing it with a discussion of Diogenes’ 
presentation of Democritus in these fragments. Güremen argues that 
Diogenes’ criticism of Democritus serves the purpose of defending the 
Epicurean doctrine against a reductio ad absurdum argument, such as 
we find in Plutarch’s Against Colotes 28-29. Curiously, Güremen (p. 196) 
seems to assume that Plutarch is actually responding to Lucretius (IV 
500-506 and V 878-924). In the final portion of the article Güremen 
argues that Diogenes’ criticism of Democritus corresponds to a tradi-
tional Epicurean defence against sceptical reductio arguments.
In the tenth article, Diogène, Lucrèce et la théorie épicurienne de 
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l’imaginaire: Fragment 9 - De rerum natura IV 971-993 (pp. 207-220), 
Alain Gigandet provides a thorough analysis of fr. 9, on perception 
and imagination, in the light of relevant passages from Epicurus and 
Lucretius. The first simulacra (εἴδωλα) to be received open up “path-
ways” (πόροι) of similar shape and size that facilitate the subsequent 
reception of similar simulacra even when the original objects are 
no longer present. However, although the process by which these 
pathways are opened up is largely mechanical, and predisposes us to 
have certain dreams and thoughts, the content of our thought is not 
entirely without our control, but can be purged and disciplined by 
right Epicurean doctrine. Gigandet’s article deviates from the other 
articles in the volume, in that it does not deal – as the volume’s subti-
tle suggests – with philosophical debates.
In the eleventh article, La Terre entière, une seule patrie. Diogène 
d’Œnoanda et la politique (pp. 221-240), Pierre-Marie Morel explores 
Diogenes’ attitude towards politics and cosmopolitism. The discussion 
consists of four parts, which, unfortunately, are not marked in the text. 
In the first part (pp. 222-226), Morel concludes, on the basis of frs. 3, 29 
(+ NF 207), and 22, that Diogenes shared Epicurus’ ambivalent attitude 
towards politics, on the one hand, distancing himself from traditional 
politics and the exercise of power, but, on the other hand, explicitly 
extending his philosophical message to the general public, including 
foreigners and future generations. In the second part (pp. 226-232), Morel 
discusses the Theological Physics-sequence, where Diogenes refutes the 
Stoic view of divine providence as the foundation of justice, law and pol-
itics. In the third part (pp. 233-237), Morel deals with fr. 56, which depicts 
a utopian community of Epicurean sages, full of mutual love and justice 
without the need for fortifications and laws. This means, according to 
Morel, that in the ideal Epicurean community justice is realized without 
a contract (but see my comments on Erler above). Morel also argues con-
vincingly that Diogenes’ description of an Epicurean utopia should not 
be viewed as a prediction about some future state, but as a hypothesis 
to be contrasted with utopias of other schools. Morel ends (pp. 237-240) 
with a discussion of fr. 30, arguing that Diogenes’ cosmopolitism is 
compatible with Epicurus’ prescribed attitude towards politics, but very 
different from Lucretius’ more private enterprise.
In the twelfth and final article, Diogenes’ Polemical Approach, or 
How to Refute a Philosophical Opponent in an Epigraphic Context (pp. 241-
269), Geert Roskam develops a theme that many of the earlier articles 
already touched upon: the rhetoric of Diogenes’ inscription. Going 
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over the various fragments, Roskam argues that Diogenes’ polemics 
had the same therapeutic aim as those of Epicurus and his early fol-
lowers, viz. to clear the way for “correct opinions”. Also the targets of 
his polemics seem to have been mostly traditional rather than contem-
porary. Yet, Diogenes’ polemics tend to be milder than Epicurus’, and 
their style is dictated by the medium of the inscription as well as by 
the short attention span of its readers, favouring short and simplified 
versions of his opponents’ views. Thereby Diogenes displays various 
approaches: Roskam distinguishes a schoolmasterly, a rhetorical and a 
commonsensical mode. These observations are then put to the test in a 
case study focusing on the “Theological Physics-sequence”, the longest 
continuous passage of the inscription. Through a detailed survey of the 
text Roskam manages to identify nearly all the earlier observed aspects 
and techniques of Diogenes’ polemical style in this passage too. In the 
concluding sections Roskam speculates on the question why Diogenes 
should want to bother his readers with polemics against thinkers who 
had been «dead for more than half a millennium» (p. 267). He offers 
two speculative answers: (1) Diogenes needed these polemics to provide 
a contrast with, and thereby to clarify and confirm his own Epicurean 
views, and (2) he wanted to take his readers seriously and acquaint them 
with the philosophical arguments that led him to adopt these views.
Together the articles in this volume develop many different, and 
often new, points of view on the inscription, sometimes confirming, 
sometimes contradicting each other, and thereby showing that the 
research into the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda is still an on-go-
ing affair. The volume therefore presents an ideal point of access for 
those who want to familiarize themselves with the inscription and the 
current state of the research.
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